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Abstract: International dairy industries remain among the most distorted agricultural
sectors. Dairy average bound tariffs remain among the highest of all agricultural
commodities, and dairy trade is characterized by a large number of megatariffs and tariff-
rate quotas (TRQs). The objective of our study is to examine how the international dairy
markets might respond to policy changes under various assumptions, using a partial
equilibrium, multiple-commodity, multiple-region model of agricultural policy and trade.
Our results indicate that liberalization will reduce supplies, increase dairy trade, and raise
world prices.
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Dairy industries around the world remain among the most distorted agricultural sectors. Dairy
average bound tariffs remain among the highest of all agricultural commodities, and dairy trade
is characterized by a large number of megatariffs and tariff-rate quotas (TRQs). Canada, the
European Union (EU), and United States have subsidized their dairy product exports. With the
highly distorted domestic and international markets, international dairy markets have benefited
only modestly from trade liberalization to date.  The World Trade Organization (WTO)
Agreement on Agriculture allowed certain WTO members to maintain a system of tariff rate
quotas.  Countries have converted non-tariff barriers to tariff rate quota systems for dairy
products to maintain import access levels and to provide minimum access levels.  Under the
agreement, many member countries also can subsidize dairy products for exports but they have
committed to reduce both subsidized quantities and expenditures.  On domestic support, dairy
support makes up a large share of aggregate support for all commodities; countries agreed to
specific reductions in aggregate support, but left dairy support largely untouched.
                                                
* Our results do not reflect the views of USDA or the U.S. Government on the impacts of dairy
trade liberalization.3
The current debate on market access in the WTO negotiations on agriculture focuses mostly on
two specific issues—the high level of over-quota tariffs and the size and administration of
quotas. It is still too early to know how further liberalization of tariffs and quotas will be handled
in the current trade talks.  Some countries support a zero-for-zero approach —complete
elimination of tariffs—while other countries favor a more moderate approach.  On export
subsidies, many countries call for complete elimination.  With respect to domestic support, the
key issue is to decide on the reduction method, Blue Box, Green Box, and de minimis.
Comprehensive studies of world dairy trade liberalization are limited.  Shaw and Love (2001),
using OECD’s AGLINK model, examined the economic effects of increasing market access and
reducing export subsidies for dairy products and found that the value of world dairy trade
increased substantially.  Relative to a 1999 baseline, the study estimates that the value of world
dairy trade rises by $1.8 billion under an increased market access scenario, with the value of milk
production rising in Australia, New Zealand, and Argentina (with increases from 7-9% relative
to the base), and declining in the EU and the United States (1.2%-1.4% decline).  With export
subsidies reduced by half, the value of milk production also increases in Australia, New Zealand,
and Argentina, declines in the EU, and does not change in the United States.
Cox, Coleman, Chavas, and Zhu (1999) used a hedonic spatial equilibrium analysis of dairy
trade liberalization for 21 world dairy regions, and found that full trade liberalization has sizable
impacts on milk prices in Canada (-32%), the EU (-26%), Japan (-36%), Australia (22%) and
New Zealand (51%).  They found only small impacts on U.S. milk producers due to small
changes in milk prices (-0.4%) and production. The study estimates consumer surplus to be about4
$10 billion higher from the base under a free trade scenario. The study does not include the
domestic support in its liberalization scenario.
There are a number of studies that analyze the effects of dairy trade policy reforms on individual
countries (Doyon and Novakovic (1996), Bouamra-mechemache and RJquillart (2000), Van
Bekkum Onno-Frank and Jerker Nilsson (2000), and Lariviere and Meilke (2000)).
Next, we briefly summarize dairy policies of major dairy product trading nations and key issues
affecting dairy trade.  We then discuss the model used in this study.  Results and suggestions for
further research follow.
Dairy Policies and Key Issues Affecting Trade
The major dairy policy instruments for most countries include income and price support, import
restrictions, and export subsidies.  A few countries also use consumer subsidies as a means of
disposing of surplus or increasing demand for dairy products. In the U.S., income support for
dairy producers includes direct payments, and ad hoc disaster assistance programs. Price support
measures include government purchase programs, intervention purchasing and storage. Price
support to EU and Canadian dairy producers also involves supply management. All price support
programs, and the most trade-distorting income support programs, are disciplined under the
domestic support provisions of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture. Trade policy instruments,
including tariffs, tariff-rate quotas, and export subsidies also provide support for prices in many
countries, but are subject to disciplines under the Market Access and Export Competition5
provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture. Appendix Table 1 outlines key domestic and trade
policy instruments for the major dairy producing countries.
Countries agreed to disciplines on dairy policies and programs under the Agreement on
Agriculture. Under Domestic Support provisions, countries agreed to reduce the total amount of
trade-distorting support, but did not require countries to reduce support to individual agricultural
commodities. Many countries left dairy policies largely untouched, and reduced support to other
commodities to comply with the aggregate support commitment. For many developed countries,
domestic dairy policies or programs represent a significant share of the total support for
agriculture. Further domestic support reductions that may be imposed in the new negotiating
round will likely put increased pressure on countries to reduce support to dairy.
Prior to the Agreement on Agriculture, highly restricted import access was the rule among major
dairy-producing countries, with the exception of Australia and New Zealand.  Under the
Agreement’s Market Access provisions, countries agreed to replace nontariff barriers like quotas,
prohibitive levies, import monopolies, and duties and other taxes with equivalent tariffs, and to
reduce those tariffs. Despite reductions, the resulting tariffs for dairy products tended to be very
high for many developed countries. To maintain existing market access levels and provide for
new access in the face of high tariffs, most major dairy trading countries established a tariff rate
quota (TRQ) system for dairy products. TRQs are two-tier tariffs that combine both tariffs and
quotas. A relatively low tariff applied to a fixed quantity of imports is coupled with higher tariffs
for quantities imported above that quantity. TRQ quantities were generally set at 3 percent of
total dairy product consumption, to increase to 5 percent over the implementation period.6
Countries already importing 3 percent of consumption set minimum import access quantities at
the existing import levels.
Access to previously protected dairy markets expanded under the Agreement. Most countries had
to increase the amount of products that could enter at relatively low tariff rates.  However, the
import access for some countries did not equal the nominal 3 percent of consumption originally
specified because fluid milk and some other fresh dairy products generally were excluded from
the calculations.  The excluded products accounted for sizable shares of total consumption in
some cases.
Differences among countries in the level and coverage of TRQs have been a source of
controversy.  The out-of-quota tariffs vary tremendously among countries, in part because they
purportedly reflect the level of protection afforded by previous nontariff barriers.  The equal
proportional reduction of these tariffs means countries with the highest protection before the
Agreement have high tariffs at the end of the Agreement’s implementation.
The very tight U.S. dairy market of 1998-99 illustrates one advantage of a TRQ system over the
previous rigid quotas. Under the new system, over-quota imports began once domestic prices
reached levels that made such imports profitable and stopped when the prices fell to levels where
importing was no longer profitable.  The new system avoids the uncertainty and lumpiness of
government policy actions to deal with tight supply situations.7
Prior to the Agriculture Agreement, many of the dairy products exported from the EU, other
western European countries, and Canada were subsidized.  The United States also exported
relatively large quantities under subsidy through the Dairy Export Incentive Program (DEIP).
Even Australia and some eastern European countries, countries not usually connected with
export subsidy programs, have used export subsidies at times. The Agreement on Agriculture
required developed countries to reduce quantities exported with subsidies and also to reduce the
expenditures on those subsidies.  Export subsidy disciplines were applied specifically to cheese,
butter, dry milks, and a miscellaneous product category.
International dairy product markets remain very distorted by export subsidies in spite of changes
that have occurred under the Agreement on Agriculture. About a third to a half of exports of the
major traded dairy products continue to be subsidized. Nonetheless, the disciplines have resulted
in reduced levels of subsidized dairy product exports.
The WTO Agreement on Agriculture was unclear about the actions a member nation could take
if their subsidized exports were below its limits during the early years of implementation.  Some
countries interpreted the agreement as allowing unused quantities or expenditures to be “rolled
over” into following years, except for the final year. The U.S. used this provision for dairy
product exports in 1997-1999, and the EU used it in 1997 and 1999.
Some issues not explicitly addressed in the Agreement have posed problems in implementing the
Export Competition provisions. Revenue pooling, whereby revenues from multiple classes or
uses of milk are collected and a single “pooled” price is returned to producers, is a common8
practice.  However, pooling may provide a means to circumvent export subsidy commitments by
allowing revenues from higher-priced domestic sales to subsidize lower-priced sales to export
markets.  Canada’s system of two-tiered pricing system was successfully challenged before the
WTO as an export subsidy and therefore must come into compliance with their commitments.
Australia had a temporary transition plan with similar effects.  Similarly, domestic price
differentials can lead to artificially low prices for manufactured dairy products, discouraging
imports and making it easier to export.
Other disciplines may themselves create distortions by inhibiting the market from allocating
product or forcing trade into uneconomic patterns. For example, dairy product markets will
always seek positions that equalize the value of milk in alternative uses. In many countries,
domestic dairy policy regimes have worked by adjusting relative values of milk and dairy
products rather than by direct controls. In general, policy measures that allow the product mix to
adjust to market conditions will minimize market distortions. Policy-related distortions like
import restrictions or export subsidies that don’t adjust to changes to relative prices can interfere
with this process.
The Agreement on Agriculture defined product categories for commitments narrowly, and
established separate, and sometimes rigid, commitments that fail to account for changes in
relative values. Establishing import restrictions or export subsidies on the basis of milk
equivalents would allow these measures to have roughly the same net impact on markets. Market
forces could then adjust the product mix, allowing trade flows in international product markets to
stay in closer balance and adjust more smoothly. Although a few countries were allowed to9
aggregate products into some form of milk equivalent, most countries’ obligations were defined
in a much more detailed way.
Other Issues
Other issues relevant to dairy product trade were covered under separate agreements. State
Trading Enterprises (STEs) have been active players in world dairy product markets. Article
XVIII of the GATT requires that STEs not discriminate among importers or exporters in making
purchases or sales. WTO members did not agree to new rules to regulate the trade and pricing
practices of agricultural STEs. Several important importing STEs (including those of Mexico and
Japan) have been eliminated or curbed. The New Zealand Dairy Board was the largest STE
involved in dairy product exports but it was absorbed by a new exporting organization. The
Canadian Dairy Commission and (at least sporadically) various government support agencies in
other countries served as minor STEs. The actions of STEs are disciplined by the general rules
affecting subsidy and market access policies, but some are concerned that lack of price
transparency could be used to mask export subsidies and import tariffs, or unfairly restrict trade
and competition.
Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) regulations are essential for protecting a country’s food safety
and animal and plant health, but sometimes have been used as barriers to legitimate trade. The
SPS Agreement required that such measures be based on objective science and applied in a
nondiscriminatory manner, but allowed countries to establish stricter-than-international standards
if based on legitimate scientific rationales.  Despite relatively strong existing SPS measures10
imposed internally on dairy products in most countries to prevent potential disease transmission
or drug or chemical contamination, they have not generally been major impediments to dairy
product trade.
Because of the high levels of support and protection that continue for many countries’ dairy
sectors, and other unresolved issues that affect trade in dairy products, the dairy sector is likely to
have a high profile in the new round of trade talks. Further liberalization could have significant
effects on individual countries and important impacts on world dairy trade.
ERS/Penn State WTO Model
The ERS/Penn State WTO model is an applied partial equilibrium, multiple-commodity,
multiple-region model of agricultural policy and trade (Abler et al, 2001, Abler, 2002, and Stout,
forthcoming 2003). It is a gross trade model that accounts for exports and imports of each
commodity in every identified region.  The model does not break out a country/region's imports
or exports by their origin or destination.  The model is dynamic in that it allows for lags in
adjustment over time in crop and livestock production, dairy processing, and oilseed crushing.
The model includes twelve countries/regions--the United States, the European Union (EU-15),
Japan, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Mexico, New Zealand, South Korea and the
rest of the world (ROW).  It has thirty-five commodities (rice, wheat, corn, other coarse grains,
soybeans, sunseed, rapeseed, peanuts, other oilseeds, cotton, sugar, soybean oil and meal,
sunseed oil and meal, rapeseed oil and meal, cottonseed oil and meal, peanut oil and meal,
tropical oils, other oilseed oil, beef and veal, pork, poultry, raw milk, butter, cheese, nonfat dry11
milk, whole dry milk, fluid milk, and other dairy products). Raw and fluid milk are included as
non-traded commodities.
The model is different from other partial equilibrium models in trade liberalization research in
that this model has explicitly incorporated a wide range of domestic and border policies in
agriculture. The core set of policies for all countries includes both specific and ad valorem
import and export taxes/subsidies, tariff-rate quotas (TRQs), and producer and consumer
subsidies.
The US model includes loan rates with marketing loan benefits for crops, and also marketing
orders and export subsidies for dairy products. The Japan model includes tariffs and "mark-ups"
such as for rice, wheat, and sugar. The EU model includes intervention prices (which entail
government purchases and then export subsidies), tariffs and import levies, compensatory
payments, acreage set-asides, and base area bounds (which limit the total area of grains and
oilseeds by cutting off payments if the base area bound is reached), and production quotas for
raw milk and sugar. Producer compensation schemes for Japan and South Korea that compensate
producers for declines in producer prices relative to a reference price are also included.  Milk
production quotas for Canada and EU are included.
The current version of the model differs from the Abler and Stout versions in two respects.
Other dairy products are tradable commodities in this study to reflect the fact that cream and
some of these products, like ice cream, are traded.  Second, the model recognizes Canada’s new
dairy export regime implemented in 2000.12
Parameters in the model come from various sources, including the European Simulation Model
(ESIM), the ERS baseline model projections, the Food and Agricultural Policy Simulator
(FAPSIM), OECD’s AGLINK model, and the SWOPSIM (Static World Policy Simulation)
model.  Adjustments and restrictions were imposed on elasticities to satisfy theoretical
requirements.
The base year for dairy data is 2001, adjusted for the 2002 Farm Bill and China’s WTO
accession in the base model solution.  Base data for crops on area, yield, production,
consumption, stocks, and trade are from the 2000 crop year and are drawn from USDA and
country sources, including the USDA PS&D database. 
1 Tariffs and TRQs are from the
Agricultural Market Access Database (AMAD)
2  and Gibson et al. (2001).
The model is a reduced form model with production, consumption, and other behavioral
variables represented by constant elasticity functions.  All countries in the model have a similar
structure with different parameters and values of variables in behavioral equations. For a net
importing country, dairy imports (and other commodity imports) are a residual to equilibrate
exports and imports.  For a net exporting country, dairy exports (and other commodity exports)
are a residual.
Dairy Product Equations
                                                
1  Found at http://www.fas.usda.gov/psd/.
2 Found at http://www.amad.org.13
Processed dairy products (butter, cheese, nonfat dry milk, whole milk power, fluid milk, and
other dairy products) consist of fat, skim solids, including protein, and water in relatively fixed
proportions.  In order to preserve this characteristic, each dairy product supply equation is
derived from its price, prices of other dairy products, and the price of raw milk.  The model also
imposes production quotas where needed and a linkage between raw milk and beef supply.
Dairy products production (PRD) for fluid milk, butter, cheese, nonfat dry milk, whole dry milk,
and other dairy products is a function of production of raw milk (PROC) and milk products in
the previous period, raw milk production in the current period and dairy product prices (PP).
Indexes j and i represent dairy products, t represents time, and αi is a constant; λ
1 is a partial
adjustment parameter; and σ
1
ij is an elasticity.  The partial adjustment parameter depends on an
adjustment cost of producing the dairy product. The higher the adjustment cost, the greater the
λ
1, and the lesser the change of PRD, given a value of σ
1
ij.




ij  is an elasticity and $i is a constant term for an i product.
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Raw Milk Processing Equation
Milk processing (PROC) is specified as function of producer (PP) and consumer (CP) prices as:
Where λ
3 is a partial adjustment parameter and σ
3 is an elasticity.
Modeling production controls are modeled using assumed supply elasticity after liberalization.
Raw milk supply response after liberalization needs further study.  Other dairy product
components in the model also require more attention due to varieties of products that lack price
and quantity data in international markets.  The current version of the model can not handle state
trading enterprises or non-trade issues in the WTO debates.  Therefore, the trade liberalization
scenarios only cover market access, domestic support, and export subsidies.
Dairy Trade Liberalization Scenarios
We conducted two liberalization scenarios—total liberalization for milk and dairy products
(Scenario I) and for all commodities (Scenario II). The objective of our scenarios is to examine
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Because the ERS/Penn State WTO model includes other commodities, we could examine the
indirect effects of dairy market liberalization on other commodities such as feed grains. A trade
liberalization scenario involves increasing market access by reducing tariffs and eliminating
TRQs, decreasing the volume of export subsidies, and decreasing producer and consumer
subsidies—to dairy products for countries in the model. Specific policies that are liberalized
include tariffs, tariff-rate quotas, mark-ups, import levies, loan rates, intervention prices, export
subsidies, production quotas, and consumer subsidies. Some other policies in the model remain
unchanged under the scenarios, including marketing orders in the U.S., compensatory payments,
set-aside, base area bound, and the Blair House provisions in the EU.
Results
The results of the experiments are presented in Table 1-2, and Figures 1-2. World dairy prices
increase for all dairy products, ranging from 9 percent for nonfat dry milk to 58 percent relative
to the base for butter for scenario I, and from 10 to 60 percent under scenario II (Table 1).  Butter
price increases the most under both scenarios. Higher world dairy product prices are expected
because of lower milk and dairy product production in heavily subsidized countries.
The world trade value increases about 37-38 percent for butter under scenarios I and II,
respectively, and 29-33 percent for cheese (Table 1).  On average, the volume of dairy product
trade is down but products are traded at higher prices due to the smaller amount of milk and
dairy products being produced after the liberalization (Figure 1).  The value of dairy trade16
increases by $2 billion under scenario I and nearly $3 billion under scenario II, an average of
nearly 28 percent increase from the base.
The medium-term effects of the experiment result in higher world dairy product prices in both
scenarios, as expected, due to lower production of raw milk and dairy products in heavily
subsidized countries (Canada, EU, Japan, and US), ranging from 3-4 percent lower under
scenario I, and 4-6 percent lower under scenario II in the EU and the United States.  Raw milk
production in Canada, however, increases due to the elimination of production quotas, about 12-
17 percent under scenario I and II, respectively.  Raw milk and dairy product prices decline in
heavily subsidized countries. Dairy product production in Canada, however, increases due to
greater milk supply. Raw milk production also increases in Australia, New Zealand, and the
South American countries, non-subsidized countries, by about 5-6 percent.
The effects of the dairy trade liberalization on the U.S. dairy sector are small relative to the value
of U.S. dairy industry (The value of U.S. dairy industry was about $60 billion in 2001). Raw
milk price declines by 8 percent from the base under scenario I, and by 5 percent under scenario
II. Cheese price is down 5 percent under scenario I, and by 3 percent under scenario II. Butter
prices decline more, as expected, about 16 percent from the base under scenario I and 15 percent
under scenario II. Raw milk production declines slightly, about 4-6 percent from the base for
both scenarios. The United States exports more cheese under the dairy-only liberalization
(scenario I), but cheese exports and imports decline under full liberalization (scenario II) for all
commodities.  Cheese imports decline 70 percent from the base, as domestic cheese production
increases about 4 percent from the base under scenario II.17
Australia, New Zealand, and Argentina, low cost non-subsidized exporting countries, gain the
most from the liberalization, with raw milk prices increasing by about 22-29 percent from their
base in both scenarios.  Dairy product prices also increase (Table 1).
Milk and dairy product prices decline in the EU, about 25 percent under scenario I and 24
percent under scenario II from the base for butter and 7 percent to 5 percent down for cheese,
under scenario I and II, respectively.  The EU exports less dairy products relative to the base.
In Canada, dairy production is up from the base due to the relaxation of the milk production
quota, although prices are down by about 34-35 percent.  Milk production value, therefore,
declines. Canada exports dairy products after liberalization.
The effects of the trade liberalization are different under both scenarios.  Feed costs decline
marginally in most major dairy producing countries under dairy only scenario (I) (Table 2).
However, when all commodities are liberalized—dairy, oilseed, livestock, and grain sectors—
feed costs increase in all these countries, except the EU because of its relatively high protection
in the grain sector.  EU livestock producers benefit from lower grain prices resulting from
liberalization.18
Table 1—Impact of International Dairy Market Liberalization
% Change from Base Milk Butter Cheese NFD WDM ODA
Percent change from base























































































































Table 2--Feed Costs, (% change)
usa e15 can arg aus nzl
Scenario I -0.6 -0.4 -0.6 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3
Scenario II 11 -8 9 12 9 619
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Conclusions and Implications
Liberalization of the dairy industry would result in lower supplies, higher world dairy prices and
higher value of dairy trade.  As expected, non-subsidized exporting countries such as Oceanic
and South American countries benefit from the liberalization, with higher trade and higher value
of milk production.  Heavily subsidized countries such as the EU, Canada, and the United States
face lower prices relative to the base. However, Canada exports more, and the United States
could potentially export more after liberalization.  For the U.S., the decline in value of milk
production is small, compared to the value of the whole dairy industry.
The experience of this study reiterates calls for further research for trade policy modeling with
respect to supply controls such as those implemented in Canada and the EU.  It is uncertain how
milk producers in both countries would react to policy changes.  Further study could shed light
on raw milk supply response after liberalization. Our research on forces shaping the dairy
industry is an ongoing process.
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DAIRY POLICY MATRIX
Table 1—Dairy Policies Affecting Trade
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Milk 77035 19.7  
1/ XX X
Butter 620 0.3 X X X X
Cheese 3790 5.1 X X X X
Nonfat dry milk
(NFDM)
695 10.2 X X X X
Whole milk
powder (WDM)




Source: USDA’s PS&D 2002 data.
1/  World production share
**: NA.23
Table 1—Dairy Policies Affecting Trade (continued)
EUROPEAN
UNION
DOMESTIC SUPPORT TRADE POLICIES

















Milk 115355 29.5 1/ X X
Butter 1740 26.2 X X X X X X
Cheese 5450 42.5 X X X X
NFDM 1040 15.4 X X X X X X
WDM 840 27 X X X
ODA XX X
Source: USDA PS&D Data.
1/ World production share.
CANADA DOMESTIC SUPPORT TRADE POLICIES
Income
Support
















Milk 8130 2.1 
1/ XXX
Butter 90 3 X X X X
Cheese 315 1.1 X X X
NFDM 100 6.1 X X X X
WDM ** ** X X
ODA XX X
Source: USDA PSD 2002 data
1/ World production share.
**: NA.24













Tariffs Import Quotas (TRQs)
Milk 11,607 /13,925 3 /3.6 
1/
Butter 166 /321 16.1 /46.8 X X
Cheese 424 /312 18.5 /24.6 X X
NFDM 273 /237 21.7 /25.1
WDM 207 /540 12.1 /37.5
ODA
Source: USDA PSD 2002 data.
1/ World production share.
Source: USDA PSD 2002 data.
1/ Only for milk for the purpose of manufacturing butter and milk powder, not for drinking milk.
**: NA.
JAPAN





















Butter 88 1.1 X X
Cheese ** 23.1 X X
NFDM 180 3.7 X X
WDM ** X X
ODA